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Planning for a War in Paradise
The 1966 Honolulu Conference and the Shape
of the Vietnam War
✣ Gregory A. Daddis
The dust had barely settled on the battlefields along the Ia Drang, a deso-
late river running through the Central Highlands of South Vietnam (formally
known as the Republic of Vietnam, or RVN), when U.S. Secretary of De-
fense Robert S. McNamara landed in Saigon on 28 November 1965. The
brutal fighting between North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars and U.S. sol-
diers from the 1st Cavalry Division had garnered widespread attention back
home, a potential harbinger of what an expanding war held in store for the
United States. While General William C. Westmoreland lauded the engage-
ment as an “unprecedented victory,” McNamara viewed the Ia Drang battles
with unease.1 American troops had performed well in combat, yet the fighting
corroborated intelligence reports of increased enemy infiltration across South
Vietnam’s porous borders. (In 1965 alone, North Vietnam sent approximately
50,000 soldiers and political cadres down the Ho Chi Minh trail, a key supply
route into the embattled South.) Returning to Washington in early December,
McNamara detailed for President Lyndon B. Johnson numerous concerns—a
“tightly stretched Vietnamese economy,” a “government of generals” lacking
widespread popular support, and an enemy expected to enlarge its presence
inside South Vietnam during the coming year. “The U.S. presence rested on
a bowl of jelly,” the defense secretary recalled years later.2
1. Westmoreland quoted in “Westmoreland Surveys Action,” The New York Times, 20 November
1965, p. 2. Harold G. Moore believed that after the Ia Drang fighting McNamara “now knew the
Vietnam War had just exploded into an open-ended and massive commitment of American men,
money, and matériel.” See Hal Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young
(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), p. 400. See also William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S.
Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part IV: July 1965–
January 1968 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), pp. 107–108.
2. Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books,
1995), p. 222; and McNamara to Johnson, 7 December 1965, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign
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Commanders in uniform shared McNamara’s worries. Jack Anderson,
writing in the Los Angeles Times, could find “no responsible general in the
Pentagon who will predict the war will be over within five years, and some
of the position papers estimate that jungle fighting will continue for 20 to
30 years.” In truth, most top-ranking officers in the U.S. Military Assis-
tance Command, Vietnam (MACV) concurred with the secretary of defense.
McNamara and MACV’s chief believed American forces had steadied a
volatile situation inside South Vietnam—Westmoreland felt they had ar-
rested “the losing trend”—though both acknowledged that military means
alone would not achieve the larger political objective of a stable, independent,
non-Communist South Vietnam.3 The day after McNamara shared his appre-
hensions with the president, Westmoreland conveyed his guidance to the 1st
Infantry Division commander, newly arrived in the RVN. The MACV chief
noted that the continuing buildup of allied forces was “providing new and es-
sential resources for the support of rural construction.” Moreover, this buildup
would permit the release of South Vietnamese units for “clearing and secur-
ing operations” so the government of South Vietnam (GVN) could “restore
its presence in newly secured areas.” An effective rural construction program,
Westmoreland concluded, “is essential to our mission.”4
Two months later, the topics of rural construction and pacification took
center stage at a major summit in Honolulu. There, at the Royal Hawaiian
Hotel, Westmoreland joined with President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, McNamara, key Pentagon officials, and RVN leaders to discuss the ex-
panding war. Johnson hoped to accomplish several aims in Honolulu. Not
only would he redirect public attention from nationally televised Senate For-
eign Relations Committee hearings on the war, led by an increasingly skep-
tical (and vocal) Senator J. William Fulbright, but he also intended to limit
criticisms of the resumed U.S. bombing of North Vietnam by focusing on
Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. III, pp. 615–616 (hereinafter referred to as FRUS,
with appropriate year and volume numbers). On infiltration numbers, see John Prados, Vietnam: The
History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–1975 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009), p. 153.
3. Jack Anderson, “20 Years of Fighting in Vietnam?” Los Angeles Times, 24 December 1965, p. A5;
and U.S. Grant Sharp and William C. Westmoreland, Report on the War in Vietnam (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 100. McNamara concurred. “We have stopped losing the
war,” he told the press but conceded it would be a “long war.” In Retrospect, p. 222.
4. COMUSMACV, “Increased Emphasis on Rural Construction,” 8 December 1965, Correspon-
dence, 1965–1966, in Box 35, Jonathan O. Seaman Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute,
Carlisle Barracks, PA (MHI). For MACV’s assessment of South Vietnam’s internal troubles in early
1966, see “USMACV Command History,” 1966, in Office of Secy, Joint Staff, Mil. Hist. Branch, En-
try MACJ03, Box 5, RG 472, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
(NARA), pp. 7–8.
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“non-military matters” that would highlight “our pacification efforts and our
economic aid.”5 For Johnson, the goal was to demonstrate his commitment
to helping the people of South Vietnam “build even while they fight.” More-
over, Johnson wanted to assure Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime
Minister Nguyen Cao Ky the United States would meet its long-term obliga-
tions to the RVN.6 The highly publicized meetings, however, were more than
a political ploy by the shrewd Texas politician. In fact, Honolulu proved to
be a key diplomatic session of the U.S. war in Vietnam, at least in the crucial
years from 1964 to 1968. During the two-day conference, McNamara and
Rusk laid out for MACV’s commander a series of objectives, both military
and non-military, that would guide the allied war effort through the 1968 Tet
Offensive, and even beyond.7
A misplaced focus on the public relations aspect of the conference has
tended to cloud many historians’ judgment of what occurred in Hawaii dur-
ing the first week of February 1966. Without question, Johnson sought to
grab headlines from the Fulbright Committee hearings on the president’s re-
quest for $400 million in supplemental funding for the war. Journalists thus
indicated the conference’s major purpose was “to lend stature and prestige to
the Saigon leaders by giving them a world stage” on which to meet the U.S.
president. The Baltimore Sun even summarized Honolulu as “much ado—not
much ado about nothing but simply much ado. . . . It was all spectacular
and diverting but so far as we can see the problem of the war is where it
5. Johnson-Rusk conversation, 3 February 1966, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. IV, pp. 203–204; Prados,
Vietnam, p. 155; and Joseph A. Fry, Debating Vietnam: Fulbright, Stennis, and Their Senate Hearings
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp. 10–11. On the bombing campaign, see Chester L.
Cooper et al., “The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam, Volume II: Elements of Paci-
fication,” March 1972, in Folder 65, U.S. Marine Corps History Division, Vietnam War Documents
Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas (TTUVA), p. 160.
6. Lyndon B. Johnson, Public Papers of the President of the United States, 1966, Book I (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 155. On Thieuand Ky, see Graham A. Cosmas,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960–1968, Part 2 (Washington, DC: Office of
Joint History, 2012), p. 442; and Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 254. According to Dallek, “Johnson and his aides treated the
meeting and its high-minded declarations as realistic solutions for transforming South Vietnam into a
stable, popular democracy that could win the war against the Communists” (p. 155).
7. For one of the few works linking the conference in Honolulu to military operations leading up to
the high-level meeting, see John M. Carland, United States Army in Vietnam: Stemming the Tide, May
1965 to October 1966 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2000), pp. 155–158. Walt W.
Rostow, who became the national security adviser in April 1966, recalled that the Honolulu meeting
“was more important than it looked, although less was decided than might have been suspected.” He
spent only one paragraph, however, on the “necessities” Westmoreland confronted in 1966 and did
not evaluate the objectives laid out by Rusk and McNamara. See W. W. Rostow, The Diffusion of
Power: An Essay in Recent History (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 452–453.
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was before the burst of activity began.”8 Historians generally have followed
suit, dismissing the conference as a “public relations gimmick.” Those who
have focused greater attention on the conference’s inner workings have sug-
gested that although Johnson paid public lip service to pacification, behind
the scenes MACV’s commander won endorsement for a strategy based pri-
marily on killing the enemy. Thus, as one recent observer has argued, “the
concrete instructions given to Westmoreland in Honolulu made attrition ‘the
primary operational objective.’” Despite the rhetoric, pacification “was given
short shrift.”9
A more substantive treatment of the Honolulu conference, however,
reveals much more substance than is usually assumed. Far from a presiden-
tial scheme to win public support for an escalating and soon to be unpopu-
lar war, the Hawaiian summit affirmed allied strategy in South Vietnam for
years to come. The goals outlined in the formal memorandum presented to
Westmoreland—“a momentous directive,” according to one senior officer—
remained the touchstone of U.S. military operations until superseded in 1969
by a policy of “Vietnamization” under the Nixon administration.10 Yet these
same objectives suggested a fundamental problem with the U.S. approach to
Vietnam. Westmoreland’s “momentous directive” contained a dangerous mix-
ture of innocence, arrogance, idealism, and unbounded optimism. Such opti-
mism developed from a definition of strategic success based on U.S. actions
rather than on social and political conditions inside South Vietnam. Although
8. Tom Wicker, “Johnson Arrives for Hawaii Talks with Saigon Aides,” The New York Times, 6 Febru-
ary 1966, p. 1; Tom Wicker, “Johnson Defends Stand on Vietnam in Hawaii Speech,” The New York
Times, 7 February 1966, p. 1; and The Baltimore Sun quoted in Senator Mike Gravel, ed., The Pen-
tagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision Making in Vietnam, 5 vols.
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1971–1972), Vol. 2, p. 557. A report on the conference noted that Johnson
hoped to “increase U.S. public support of the Administration’s Vietnam policy.” See “Presidential De-
cisions: The Honolulu Conference, February 6–8, 1966,” in Folder 2, Box 4, Larry Berman Collection
(Presidential Archives Research), TTUVA, p. 10. The U.S. Army’s official history also suggests that
President Johnson intended the conference to “dilute the impact of Fulbright’s investigation.” William
M. Hammond, United States Army in Vietnam: Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968
(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1988), p. 247.
9. George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1994), p. 68; Jonathan D. Caverley, “Explaining U.S. Military Strategy in Vietnam,” International
Security, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Winter 2010/2011), p. 130; and Jonathan D. Caverley, “The Myth of Mil-
itary Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter
2009/2010), p. 130. Bernard B. Fall believed that President Johnson, by going to Honolulu and meet-
ing with South Vietnamese leaders, had “committed the prestige of his office not only to the continued
support of the southern regime, but to that of its leaders as well.” See Bernard B. Fall, “Vietnam: The
Quest for Stability,” Current History, Vol. 52 (January 1967), p. 9.
10. Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History: 1946–1975 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988),
p. 359. For a treatment of the relationships between military leaders and the White House during the
Nixon years, see Gregory A. Daddis, Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
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senior U.S. officials acknowledged that ultimate success depended on local en-
tities, they presumed—on little more than faith alone—that they could set the
conditions for that success.11 The failure of these officials to consider the limits
of U.S. power abroad not only helps explain the outcome in Vietnam but of-
fers a cautionary tale for present policy challenges seemingly demanding U.S.
intervention overseas.
A War Requiring More than War
In early January 1966, Secretary of State Rusk dispatched an urgent telegram
to the U.S. embassy in Saigon stressing that the president was “most anx-
ious to show in every possible way our concern for peaceful development and
progress of SVN [South Vietnam] and our emphasis on non-military mea-
sures.” Johnson was serious about the role of development. “I want to have a
war that will build as well as destroy,” he exclaimed to Robert Komer, soon to
be named head of the U.S. pacification effort. The focus on nation-building
in the RVN, however, long preceded the Johnson administration. Since the
division of Indochina at the 1954 Geneva summit, U.S. officials had wrestled
with the problems of building a viable, non-Communist state in the South.
Michigan State University fielded an advisory group in 1955 that counseled
South Vietnamese administrators and civic leaders on topics ranging from
public information and finance to building a transportation and communica-
tion infrastructure.12 Wesley R. Fishel, a political scientist at Michigan State,
suggested two “salient facts” influenced South Vietnamese politics: “violent
subversive activity of the Communists” and the country’s “achievements in
the economic and social fields.” Even the head of the U.S. military advisory
11. Dallek in Flawed Giant, p. 358, suggests that the “hopes of the Honolulu declarations rested on
illusions that could not withstand conditions in South Vietnam.” Thus, the conference seemed to
accord with what one contemporary correspondent deemed the “American experience in Vietnam—
optimism followed by disappointment and frustration.” See Charles B. Flood, The War of the Innocents
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 192.
12. Rusk memorandum, 4 January 1966, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. IV, p. 14. Rusk recalled the diffi-
culties of nation-building in a time of war. “It isn’t easy to improve education and improve agriculture
and restrain inflation and do all these things in the middle of a war, particularly a guerrilla-type war
which subjected the government structure in the countryside to continued harassment. It’s hard to
build schools when schoolteachers are being assassinated.” Dean Rusk, interview by Paige E. Mulhol-
lan, 2 January 1970, in Oral History Collection, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin,
Texas (LBJL). Johnson quoted in Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for
Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), p. 298. On MSUG, see James M. Carter, Inventing Vietnam:
The United States and State Building, 1954–1968 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008),
p. 49.
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group maintained that military operations alone were insufficient. Although
General Samuel T. Williams worried about the military threat posed by both
conventional and guerrilla forces, he acknowledged that the government must
embrace “political, psychological, economic, administrative, and military ac-
tion” to be successful.13
Amid the social and political unrest in South Vietnam, however, such
aspirations were difficult to realize. President Ngo Dinh Diem, an ardent na-
tionalist and anti-Communist, struggled to build a durable state in the af-
termath of an eight-year war with France. Capable administrators were in
short supply. Agrarian reform measures reaped only modest gains in uniting
those living across the rural countryside. The seeds of a growing insurgency
movement already were taking root. Perhaps most importantly, Diem con-
fronted an ultimately intractable problem—gaining legitimacy among and es-
tablishing governmental control over a population distrustful of the Saigon
regime.14 Although Diem aspired to engineer a social revolution inside South
Vietnam, he too often (though by some estimates, necessarily) focused his at-
tention on internal “security matters.” U.S. critics bemoaned what they saw
as the increasingly brutal tactics of a police state. Ambassador Elbridge Dur-
brow, writing in 1957, complained of the RVN president’s “suspiciousness
and authoritarianism” and concluded that the “base of the regime’s popular
support remains narrow.”15 Senior U.S. officials clearly understood the diffi-
culties of intervening in Southeast Asia yet presupposed their capacity (and
wherewithal) to participate successfully in nation-building efforts overseas.
If U.S. officials viewed skeptically their South Vietnamese allies’ concep-
tions of nationhood in the modern era, they did so through the lens of New
Deal–era reforms. Most U.S. aid officials saw in Franklin Roosevelt’s liberal
13. Wesley R. Fishel, “Political Realities in Vietnam,” Asian Survey, Vol. 1, No. 2 (April 1961), p. 15;
and Williams memorandum, 28 December 1955, in FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. I, p. 608. On Williams’s
focusing on more than just military matters, see also Briefing Charts, Personal Use of Lt. General S.
T. Williams, 31 May 1957, in Conversations with President Diem Folder, Box 3, Samuel T. Williams
Papers, MHI.
14. Wolf I. Ladejinsky, “Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam,” in Wesley R. Fishel, ed., Prob-
lems of Freedom: South Vietnam since Independence (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961),
pp. 153–173. On Diem, see Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the
Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), pp. 87, 171. For an assess-
ment of the political situation in Saigon at the time of the Honolulu conference, see David Marr,
“Political Attitudes and Activities of Young Urban Intellectuals in South Viet-Nam,” Asian Survey,
Vol. 6, No. 5 (May 1966), pp. 249–263.
15. Durbrow quoted in Robert Mann, A Grand Delusion: America’s Descent into Vietnam (New York:
Basic Books, 2001), p. 212. On Diem’s problems, see pp. 179, 184. For a more sympathetic treatment
of Diem, see Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006).
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policy agenda an archetype for economic and political progress abroad. Thus,
advocates of “high modernism” believed in government’s ability to fund and
administer massive aid projects that would modernize underdeveloped coun-
tries and, in due course, promote economic dividends and political constancy.
Rural democracy, electrification, and agricultural programs all went hand in
hand.16 No wonder, then, that in April 1965, in a major speech on Vietnam
at Johns Hopkins University, President Johnson cited the most ambitious of
New Deal programs, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) hydroelectricity
project. “The vast Mekong Delta can provide food and water and power on
a scale to dwarf even our own TVA,” Johnson declared. In the same speech,
the president spoke about the “wonders of modern medicine,” the establish-
ment of schools to “train people in the skills needed to manage the process
of development,” and the effort “to replace despair with hope and terror with
progress.” As if to demonstrate resolve in assisting with the RVN’s social revo-
lution, Johnson brought with him to Honolulu in 1966 Secretary of Agricul-
ture Orville Freeman and Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John
Gardner.17
Carrying forward the legacy of New Deal reformers, U.S. aid officials
and technical experts traveling to Vietnam in the late 1950s and early 1960s
hardly questioned the underlying assumptions on which modernization theo-
ries rested. To these interventionists, the Allied victory in 1945 had left a dan-
gerously unpredictable world in its wake, while the subsequent anti-colonial
struggles in Africa and Asia called for long-term solutions to global instabil-
ity.18 The rising threat of Communism did little to assuage fears of perpetual
dangers abroad. Yet modernization theory was far more than a response to
16. Miller, Misalliance, pp. 56–58; Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and
the Modern Historical Experience (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), p. 237; and Fishel, “Political
Realities in Vietnam,” p. 20. There were, of course, deficiencies undergirding the latent “economic
man” logic Walt Rostow’s stages of development model. Not all local leaders saw the United States
as the apogee of political thought and systems. See W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A
Non-Communist Manifesto (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
17. Johnson speech in Robert J. McMahon, ed., Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War,
2nd ed. (Lexington, MA: DC Heath, 1995), p. 213; and Cooper et al., “The American Experience
with Pacification in Vietnam,” p. 223. Secretary Freeman, who went to the RVN after the conference,
recalled that the South Vietnamese government was “very cooperative,” but he never got “down to the
nuts and bolts implementation where the real problems would reside.”See Orville Freeman, interview
by T. H. Baker, 21 July 1969, in Oral History Collection, LBJL.
18. On the origins of modernization theory, see Dean C. Tipps, “Modernization Theory and the
Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective,” Comparative Studies in Society and History,
Vol. 15, No. 2 (March 1973), pp. 200–210; and Michael E. Latham, “Redirecting the Revolution?
The USA and the Failure of Nation-Building in South Vietnam,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27,
No. 1 (2006), pp. 28–32.
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Cold War Communism. It promised a way to create nation-states and na-
tional identities, a progression through which backward states could grow and
become more modern, more American in body as well as outlook. In the pro-
cess, traditional loyalties to families and communities, invariably susceptible
to Communist subversion, modernizers supposed, could be transferred to the
enlightened nation. Here was a way to link individuals to new, democratic
social structures that would participate in a larger (U.S.-aligned) global com-
munity.19 Putting theory into practice, however, required a laboratory, and
Southeast Asia seemed an appropriate test case for building dynamic, ratio-
nal, modern nations while combating Communism overseas. When Johnson
recalled after his presidency that he wanted to “develop democratic forms” in
the “young Asian country” of South Vietnam, he spoke in terms easily recog-
nizable to modernization theorists.20
If progressive foreign policy advocates agreed on the outcome for a mod-
ern, democratic RVN, they fiercely debated how best to achieve social and
economic progress, and thus long-term governmental stability, in a regime
contending with both an external threat from the north and a growing insur-
gency within its own borders. Few agreed how to shepherd South Vietnam
from a “traditional” to a “modern” society. While high modernists advocated
a centrally planned, technologically driven approach, low modernists encour-
aged decentralization and local aid programs.21 In the process, U.S. officials
too often failed to ask the South Vietnamese themselves which methods most
suited their needs. As with so many social science models, modernization the-
ory, according to Mark T. Berger, held “little or no regard for questions of
time and place” and undermined existing relationships “to the temporal and
spatial specificity of the formation, consolidation or collapse of new nation-
states.” Moreover, theoretical models hardly took into account the competing
ideologies permeating South Vietnamese society in the late 1950s and early
19. On national identities, anti-Communism, and traditional loyalties, see Mark T. Berger, “Decoloni-
sation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political Development Theory and the Appeal of Com-
munism in Southeast Asia, 1945–1975,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3 (October
2003), pp. 422, 429, 435. On social structures, see Miller, Misalliance, p. 66.
20. Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963–1969 (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 242. Less than two years after Honolulu, Charles A. Joiner
found that the “nation-building procedures of 1967, even when combined with definite military ad-
vances, did not permeate the underlying sources of Saigon’s difficulties.” See Charles A. Joiner, “South
Vietnam: Political, Military and Constitutional Arenas in Nation Building,” Asian Survey, Vol. 8,
No. 1 (January 1968), p. 71.
21. Miller, Misalliance, pp. 66–68; Carter, Inventing Vietnam, p. 35; and Christopher T. Fisher, “The
Illusion of Progress: CORDS and the Crisis of Modernization in South Vietnam, 1965–1968,” Pacific
Historical Review, Vol. 75, No. 1 (February 2006), p. 36.
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1960s. This was no clean slate on which U.S. technicians and political sci-
entists could work their magic. In the end, only local leaders and the people
of South Vietnam could ascertain (and achieve) the proper balance between
tradition and modernity.22
To most U.S. officials considering the problem of nation-building in
Southeast Asia, one local condition appeared to rank highest among numer-
ous, often competing, priorities: Modernization could occur only in a secure
environment. Counterinsurgency enthusiasts and senior officers chomped at
the bit to prove the worth of military means in promoting government sta-
bility and, ultimately, American-inspired democracy. History seemed to vali-
date their claims. Retired four-star general and U.S. ambassador to the RVN
Maxwell D. Taylor warned of
trying too much in the civil field before an adequate level of security was reached.
We should have learned from our frontier forebears that there is little use of
planting corn outside the stockade if there are still Indians around in the woods
outside.23
Weeks before the Honolulu conference, David E. Bell, administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), struck a sim-
ilar chord. Bell defined “pacification” as a process that began with sweeping
enemy military units from an area, establishing “local security against ter-
rorism,” and then fostering “effective institutions of local government.” Few
if any critics questioned this sequential process of nation building. In what
would become a popular portrayal of U.S. Army operations in Vietnam, Bell
suggested that a “steady widening of . . . ‘pacified’ areas” could be achieved
only “behind the shield of military protection.” No matter that, in the pro-
cess, the visibility Johnson hoped to place on economic and social develop-
ment might be diminished.24
22. Berger, “Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building,” p. 423; and Neil L. Jamieson, Un-
derstanding Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 99, 257. For a fine overview
of the war from the South Vietnamese perspective, a war viewed as one of “competing visions” for
Vietnam’s future, see Mark Philip Bradley, Vietnam at War (New York: Oxford University Press,
2009).
23. Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 340. Miller, Mis-
alliance, p. 82. On tensions between security and reform in contemporary debates over how best
to defeat insurgency movements, see Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of Ameri-
can Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1986),
p. 192.
24. Bell to Johnson, 19 January 1966, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. IV, p. 85; and Fisher, “The Illusion
of Progress,” p. 41. Military officers spoke in similar terms. In November 1965, a few months before
the Honolulu conference, Marine General Lewis Walt wrote Westmoreland that he understood his
“primary mission” was to “provide a security shield behind which the ARVN can develop a reliable
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In the summer of 1965, MACV’s commander followed a similar sequen-
tial approach to security and development when crafting his own concept of
operations for allied forces in the RVN. Westmoreland emphasized the need
to provide security to the population, both from large, well-equipped forces
looming outside the country and from “the guerrilla, the assassin, the ter-
rorist, and the informer.” To the general, only the South Vietnamese Army
(ARVN) could make “real progress and succeed” against the latter threats.25
In September, Westmoreland elaborated his concept further in a directive to
his subordinate commanders. After cautioning his leaders to make a conscious
effort to “minimize battle casualties among those noncombatants who must
be brought back into the fold” of government control, the MACV chief un-
derscored his larger goals. The “ultimate aim is to pacify the Republic of Viet-
nam by destroying the VC [Vietcong] . . . while at the same time reestablishing
the government apparatus, strengthening GVN military forces, rebuilding the
administrative machinery, and re-instituting the services of the Government.”
This was an extremely tall order, one that would test the limits of U.S. in-
fluence abroad. Westmoreland’s strategic concept, however, rested on similar
assumptions displayed at Honolulu. Not only did most U.S. policymakers
and military leaders take for granted their ability to keep the enemy “off bal-
ance”; they also accepted, despite the difficulties they surely would face, their
capacity to build functioning nation-states even in the midst of brutal civil
wars.26
Westmoreland’s notion that U.S. military operations should set the foun-
dation for RVN pacification and civic action accorded well with contemporary
literature and U.S. Army doctrine. Writing in 1964, French military theorist
David Galula outlined a blueprint for a general “strategy” of counterinsur-
gency. Following a “step-by-step procedure,” the counterinsurgent was first
to destroy the main body of armed insurgents before establishing contact
with the population and then educating the leaders in a “national political
rural construction program.” See Walt to Westmoreland, 19 November 1965, in Folder 7, Box 2,
Official Correspondence, Series I, W. C. Westmoreland Collection, MHI.
25. Concept of Operations, 13 June 1965, The Pentagon Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 606–608. For a com-
parison to Westmoreland’s approach one year later, see “Concept of Military Operations in South
Vietnam,” 26 August 1966, in Folder 3, Box 5, Larry Berman Collection (Presidential Archives Re-
search), TTUVA.
26. Westmoreland directive to U.S. commanders, 17 September 1965, in Michael H. Hunt, ed., A
Vietnam War Reader: A Documentary History from American and Vietnamese Perspectives (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2010), pp. 89–90. For a fuller discussion of U.S. strategy, see
Gregory A. Daddis, Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2014).
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movement.”27 Laying aside the dubious claim that counterinsurgency was in-
deed a strategy, Galula’s methodical, and thus accessible, approach to defeat-
ing insurgent movements appealed to U.S. Army officers heading off to Viet-
nam. The French officer’s ideas were far from exceptional. American John J.
McCuen encouraged a similar methodology in The Art of Counter-
Revolutionary Warfare, published the same year as the Honolulu conference.
Discussing the topic of civic action, McCuen, a lieutenant colonel, maintained
that the “destruction of the revolutionary organization must be followed by
construction of a counter-revolutionary substitute.” Military and police ac-
tion would first “break the hold of the terrorists on the population,” before
civic action teams followed with a construction plan to gain “close person-to-
person contact with the population.” No surprise then that the April 1965
Advisor Handbook for Counterinsurgency, a U.S. Army doctrinal pamphlet,
spoke of “clear and hold” operations to create a secure physical environment
before establishing firm governmental control and “willing support of the
population.”28
The November 1965 battles along the Ia Drang should be considered
within this theoretical and doctrinal context. Shielding the population re-
quired the allies to combat two types of enemy threat—conventional units
infiltrating from North Vietnam and insurgent forces from within the RVN’s
borders. Counterinsurgency alone would not shield the population, a point
stressed by Westmoreland. Thus, the 1965 fighting in the Central Highlands
exemplified MACV’s justifiable concerns over porous borders between South
Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos. Counterinsurgency operations made little
sense against the three North Vietnamese regiments concentrating in Pleiku
Province and aiming to spearhead an offensive that would cut deeply into
the RVN by controlling the crucial Highway 19.29 To the MACV comman-
der, no pacification effort could succeed if these main force units remained
27. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1964), p. 80. For a more critical review of Galula’s work, see Grégor Mathias, Galula in Algeria:
Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory, trans. by Neal Durando (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011).
28. John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counterinsurgency (St. Pe-
tersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), p. 152; and U.S. Department of the Army, Advisor Handbook
for Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 31-73 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April
1965), p. 58.
29. On the battle’s larger strategic setting, see George C. Herring, “The 1st Cavalry and the Ia Drang
Valley, 18 October–24 November 1965,” in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., America’s
First Battles, 1776–1965 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), pp. 308–316. On why
MACV’s operational approach made sense, see Dale Andrade, “Westmoreland Was Right: Learning
Wrong Lessons from the Vietnam War,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 2008),
pp. 145–181.
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free to roam the countryside and strike population centers at will. Despite
the successful fighting along the Ia Drang, these concerns hardly dissipated in
1966. Charles Mohr, a correspondent for The New York Times, reported on
the eve of the Honolulu conference that there were “now 230,000 to 250,000
pro-Communist troops in South Vietnam, including Vietcong guerrillas and
about 11 tough regiments of the North Vietnamese Army.” According to
Mohr, that was “at least twice as many enemy troops as there were at the
start of last year, despite the major United States build-up since then.”30
However, the mushrooming of enemy troops inside the RVN did not pre-
vent senior U.S. officials from considering the conflict’s nonmilitary aspects.
In fact, by December 1965 most U.S. policymakers admitted that Opera-
tion Rolling Thunder, the strategic bombing campaign against North Viet-
nam, was failing to persuade Hanoi’s leaders not to support the southern
insurgency.31 By the new year, almost all U.S. military personnel were empha-
sizing the need for more than just military operations. Westmoreland called
for “‘complete integration’ of all U.S. programs, military and civilian, that
were involved in pacification.” David Bell, returning from an early January
trip to Vietnam, told the president and the National Security Council (NSC)
staff that the “Number one problem is rural pacification.”32 Two weeks later,
McNamara wrote Johnson that deploying additional U.S. forces would fa-
cilitate several objectives: permitting control of critical roads and railways,
increasing government control over the population, destroying enemy base
areas, and “attriting” enemy forces at an increased rate. Even with these ad-
ditional deployments, McNamara concluded that the “odds are about even”
whether the allies would face a stalemate in early 1967.33 The goals outlined in
this late January memorandum to the president mirrored those drafted at the
Honolulu conference the following month. That they gave the United States
30. Charles Mohr, “The Honolulu Agenda,” The New York Times, 7 February 1966, p. 6; and William
C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), pp. 189–190. On West-
moreland seeing the “reinstitution of governmental services and activities” as closely linked with mili-
tary operations, see MACV Directive 525-4, “Tactics and Techniques for Employment of U.S. Forces
in the Republic of Vietnam,” 17 September 1965, in Vietnam Tactics & Techniques in Country
Publications Folder, Historian’s Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Fort McNair,
Washington, DC.
31. The Pentagon Papers, Vol. 4, pp. 53–54.
32. Westmoreland and Bell quoted in Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, p. 185. For
an alternative perspective, see Merle L. Pribbenow II, “Rolling Thunder and Linebacker Campaigns:
The North Vietnamese View,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 10, No. 3/4 (Fall–
Winter 2001), pp. 197–210.
33. McNamara to Johnson, 14 January 1966, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. IV, pp. 115–117. For a
contemporary critique of U.S. strategy, see Stanley Karnow, “Despite Staggering Commitment, Goals
Appear Clouded in Saigon,” The Washington Post, 3 February 1966, p. A6.
163
Daddis
only a 50-50 chance of success suggested grave inadequacies with the strategic
approach to the war in Vietnam.
Setting American Goals in Hawaii
“Tonight the cup of peril is full in Vietnam.” So remarked President Johnson
in his State of the Union address to Congress on 12 January 1966. Although
the president’s rhetorical flourish struck an alarmist tone, the brewing war
in Southeast Asia seemed to warrant heightened anxiety. A 37-day bombing
pause over North Vietnam had failed to spur progress in peace negotiations,
instead garnering fiery debate at home over U.S. strategy and political aims.
House Armed Services Committee Chairman L. Mendel Rivers warned that
the war “was getting very unpopular the way we are conducting it.”34 On
3 February, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee agreed to hold public
hearings on Vietnam. Senator Fulbright hoped the hearings would “inform
the American people . . . as fully as possible about the implications of the war
in Vietnam,” especially in light of the president’s request for $12.7 billion in
supplemental funds. Senator Wayne L. Morse more bluntly declared the tele-
vised inquiry would force the White House “out in the public.” The following
day, committee members began questioning USAID’s Bell. Johnson, sensing
the shifting political landscape, took the offensive. Even as administration of-
ficials were being grilled by Fulbright’s committee, television newscasters in-
terrupted their networks’ coverage of the hearings to announce that Johnson
was departing the next day for a major summit in Hawaii to meet with RVN
leaders.35
Though hastily convened, the conference in Honolulu proved more than
a simple redirection of television cameras. With the failure of the bomb-
ing pause, Johnson believed it crucial to reinforce his commitment to in-
augurating “certain pacification programs in the fields of health, education,
and agriculture in Vietnam.” During the welcoming ceremony at Honolulu
34. Johnson, Public Papers of the President of the United States, p. 7. Rivers quoted in Dallek, Flawed
Giant, p. 351. On the bombing pause, see Wallace J. Thies, When Governments Collide: Coercion
and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–1968 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980),
p. 127.
35. Fulbright and Morse quoted in Fry, Debating Vietnam, p. 31; and Gibbons, The U.S. Government
and the Vietnam War, pp. 222, 230. See also Randall B. Woods, “Dixie’s Dove: J. William Fulbright,
the Vietnam War, and the American South,” in Randall B. Woods, ed., Vietnam and the American
Political Tradition: The Politics of Dissent (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 149–
170.
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International Airport, the president declared that he had come to “talk of
our resolution to defend peace and to build a decent society for the people
of South Vietnam.” Prime Minister Ky, sharing the spotlight with Thieu,
concentrated on four points during his speech: “defeating the Vietcong,
eradicating social injustice, establishing a viable economy, and building true
democracy.”36 No doubt these intentions met with favor among the U.S. co-
hort, yet Johnson pressed the South Vietnamese leaders further at a private
meeting on 7 February. Showing little appreciation of the revolutionary strug-
gle inside the RVN, Johnson urged Ky and Thieu to “develop better contacts
with the VC in order to gain increased understanding of the movement.”
The exhortation likely baffled both men, who surely comprehended the un-
derlying principles and political reach of the National Liberation Front. Still,
Westmoreland believed Ky and Thieu were grateful, not only for the moral
and physical support provided by Johnson but also because “they were treated
with dignity as an ally.”37
The initial press reactions highlighted Johnson’s attempt, in his first trip
outside the North American continent as president, to lend stature to the
South Vietnamese authorities. Yet, although domestic support for the war
remained reasonably high, some journalists questioned the president’s hopes
for stimulating political and economic progress abroad. The Christian Science
Monitor suggested that failure had sent Johnson to Hawaii, “the failure of
American democracy to touch the Asian people it is defending and to change
the down-trodden condition of their lives.” Tom Wicker of The New York
Times observed the president’s trip was “seeking to take away headlines—and
possible witnesses—from the televised inquiry of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.” (Indeed, Fulbright protested wartime executive commitments
without congressional consideration or approval.)38 Nonetheless, almost all
36. Nguyen Cao Ky with Marvin J. Wolf, Buddha’s Child: My Fight to Save Vietnam (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 2002), p. 186; Johnson, Public Papers, p. 151; and “Presidential Decisions: The
Honolulu Conference, February 6–8, 1966,” p. 18. Under Secretary of State George Ball, for his part,
“viewed the whole idea of a conference as being absolutely appalling because I was convinced that the
President got out there with whoever happened to be the head of the government in Vietnam, and we
were going to get in deeper and deeper and deeper.” See George Ball, interview by Paige E. Mulhollan,
8 July 1971, in Oral History Collection, LBJL.
37. Moyers to Johnson, 12 February 1966, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. IV, p. 227; and William C.
Westmoreland, interview by Paul L. Miles, 7 January 1971, in Box 1, Paul L. Miles Papers, MHI,
p. 4.
38. Saville R. Davis, “Johnson Pursues Vietnam Reforms,” The Christian Science Monitor, 7 February
1966, p. 1; Wicker, “Johnson Arrives for Hawaii Talks with Saigon Aides,” p. 1; and Wicker, “Johnson
Defends Stand on Vietnam in Hawaii Speech,” p. 1. For a more positive view, see “A Change of Em-
phasis in the Vietnam War?” The Hartford Courant, 8 February 1966, p. 18. Business Week trumpeted
that at Honolulu Johnson “abruptly switched the emphasis in the Vietnam war from military action
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media outlets took notice of Johnson’s emphasis on the non-military aspects
of the war. Westmoreland did his part as well. The day before Johnson arrived
in Honolulu, the MACV commander held a press conference at the Royal
Hawaiian Hotel warning of a long war that would not be “concluded by a
single battle or campaign.” Westmoreland then noted that, concurrent with
any military operations, the GVN would be pursuing rural construction and
pacification programs. Once enemy forces were destroyed, the government
could “move forward in improving the lot of the people through civic action,
to include military aid, construction of dispensaries, maternity wards, schools
. . . and programs to improve their agriculture and the general productivity of
the country.”39
These public pronouncements mirrored private meetings, especially be-
tween U.S. policymakers and military leaders. Even though Johnson stressed
at the plenary session’s conclusion that he wanted MACV’s commander to
“nail the coonskin to the wall”—Westmoreland recalled that the wartime pres-
ident was “looking for success”—he still pressed his advisers behind closed
doors on nonmilitary action. Without question, Johnson’s reluctant approval
of an increase in U.S. troop strength to 440,000 men by the end of 1966 sug-
gested his commitment to fighting across the breadth of the RVN.40 Yet the
conference proceedings also demonstrated a genuine commitment to what
increasingly would become dubbed “the other war,” a phrase referring to
allied pacification plans. The U.S. delegation examined internal RVN pro-
grams, covering topics from village council elections to troop indoctrination
programs, from land reform to care of refugees. Secretary of State Rusk led
discussions on measures “to increase pressure on Hanoi to bring them to
the conference table.” Health and Education Secretary Gardner covered the
training of health personnel and the building of effective medical logistics
systems, and Agriculture Secretary Freeman assessed food and fertilizer pro-
duction programs and experimentation with new strains of rice, corn, and
to works of peace.” See “Adding Social Reform to Vietnam Arsenal,” Business Week, 12 February 1966,
p. 27. On congressional oversight, see Fry, Debating Vietnam, p. 116.
39. Cooper et al., “The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam,” pp. 3, 6. For a contem-
porary critique of this approach, one that saw a disparity between concept and practice, see Ray Cole
Hillam, “What Guns, Bombs, and Lives Have Not Purchased: The Frustration of Vietnam,” Brigham
Young University Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Autumn 1967), pp. 47–59.
40. Westmoreland, interview by Miles, p. 1. Johnson’s “coonskin” comment is reported in Larry
Berman, “From Intervention to Disengagement: The United States in Vietnam,” in Foreign Mili-
tary Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992),
p. 43. On troop strength increases, see Prados, Vietnam, p. 151; and Edward J. Drea, McNamara, Clif-
ford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965–1969 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Historical Office, 2011), p. 123.
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vegetable seeds.41 These multiple tracks of inquiry, far from a media relations
ruse, in fact cohered around the basic foundation of U.S. military strategy
established by Westmoreland the previous summer.
The MACV commander’s meetings with the president, defense secretary,
and representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) further revealed a
dedication to advancing a comprehensive plan for the political-military war
inside the RVN. Westmoreland described a “formidable task” ahead, reiter-
ating his belief that the allies “were not going to turn the tide in any single
battle or campaign.” In this war, the general advised, “physical and psycho-
logical factors were closely related.”42 As during the previous summer’s debate
over committing U.S. ground combat troops to Vietnam, much of the discus-
sion in Honolulu revolved around the forecasting and resourcing of U.S. de-
ployment numbers. (The JCS harped on a familiar theme—pressing Johnson,
unsuccessfully, to authorize a call-up of reserve forces.) Westmoreland, how-
ever, wanted Johnson to grasp the difficulties that lay ahead. MACV still had
to establish a sound logistical system while reorienting the South Vietnamese
armed forces toward the difficult tasks of rural construction and pacification.
The general also explained that the ARVN was “very young and that its leader-
ship was quite mediocre.”43 Although the president recalled gaining a “better
understanding of the problems we faced and of what needed to be done to
make progress,” the conference at Honolulu proved unsettling for him. To-
ward the end of one meeting with Westmoreland, he cautioned the MACV
commander. “There’s a lot riding on you. I don’t expect you to let me down.”
Adding a finer point, a fatigued Johnson, alluding to frayed civil-military re-
lations during the Korean War, warned, “I hope you don’t pull a MacArthur
on me.”44
41. Bundy memorandum, 23 February 1966, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. IV, pp. 246–255. On the
consequences of this focus on agricultural output, see Simon Toner, “‘The Life and Death of Our
Republic’: Modernization, Agricultural Development and the Peasantry in the Mekong Delta in the
Long 1970s,” in Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake, eds., Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating
Independence (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).
42. Westmoreland, interview, in MHI, p. 1. The general spoke in similar terms in his long-range
planning for 1967. See Westmoreland to Admiral Sharp and General Wheeler, CJCS, “Strategy and
Concept of Operations for 1967,” 11 December 1966, in U.S. Strategy, Vietnam Folder, Historian’s
Files, CMH.
43. Westmoreland interview, p. 5; The Pentagon Papers, Vol. 4, pp. 311–314; and Cosmas, The Joint
Chiefs of Staff and The War in Vietnam, p. 442. On building South Vietnam’s armed forces, see James
Lawton Collins, Jr., The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950–1972 (1975;
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002).
44. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 243; Westmoreland, interview, p. 8; Westmoreland, A Soldier Re-
ports, p. 193; and Samuel Zaffiri, Westmoreland: A Biography of General William C. Westmoreland (New
York: William Morrow, 1994), pp. 159–160.
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Whether admonition or expression of confidence (Westmoreland be-
lieved the latter), Johnson’s warning arguably revealed underlying anxieties
about the war’s trajectory. Still hoping to limit the conflict and concentrate on
his domestic agenda, the president saw in Hawaii the mounting sacrifices that
would be needed to contain Communism throughout the RVN. Building a le-
gitimate political system centered on Saigon potentially meant years of effort.
Yet despite warning signs—the failure of the bombing campaign over North
Vietnam and the continued political instability within the GVN—Johnson
pressed forward.45 Though difficulties surely lay ahead, Westmoreland had
stemmed the tide and, at least for the moment, had stabilized the military
situation. A comprehensive plan incorporating both military and nonmilitary
programs might well see the allies through and convince the leaders in Hanoi
that their war was unwinnable. Accordingly, the Honolulu conference pro-
duced two major allied objectives: to defeat Vietcong and North Vietnamese
Army forces and compel their withdrawal from the South; and to “extend
GVN dominion, direction, and control” over South Vietnam. In the process,
U.S. units assisted South Vietnamese forces in “clearing and securing the civic
action operations.” Although offensive battles and campaigns were not part of
the rural construction effort, they were “constituted concomitantly with it.”
The prime focus of combat-capable units, senior military officers at Pacific
Command concluded, “must be directed to the search and destroy effort.”46
The phrase “search and destroy” has long been equated with military
ineptitude and even outright malfeasance, but critics often downplay the com-
mitment of North Vietnamese and Vietcong insurgency leaders to the mili-
tary struggle. The battlefield mattered to the enemy. According to Lien-Hang
Nguyen, Le Duan, the North Vietnamese Politburo First Secretary, “drew a
significant lesson from the First Indochina War: diplomacy without military
45. Although the evidence does not conclusively indicate what Johnson expected to accomplish in
Honolulu, the president recalled coming back from the conference “refreshed and confident.” How-
ever, his public comments upon returning—noting that the “road ahead may be long and may
difficult”—suggest he did not think victory was in reach. See Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 245.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., argued that U.S. leaders repeatedly believed victory attainable if only a modest
additional effort was added to the war effort. Yet each vision of victory proved to be beyond their grasp,
which is how the United States ended up fighting an unwinnable war and pursuing unreachable goals.
See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941–1966
(New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1967). Daniel Ellsberg, on the other hand, took the position that the
United States persisted in Vietnam not because victory seemed possible but because the situation was
so bleak that all U.S. leaders could do was hang on in the hope that the war might be ended on
favorable terms. See “The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine,” Public Policy, Spring 1971,
pp. 217–274.
46. The Pentagon Papers, Vol. 4, p. 315. On building a legitimate political system, see John C. Donnell
and Charles A. Joiner, “South Vietnam: ‘Struggle’ Politics and the Bigger War,” Asian Survey, Vol. 7,
No. 1 (January 1967), p. 53.
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superiority should be avoided at all costs.”47 By 1966, Le Duan had prevailed
over the cabinet members who wanted to pursue a negotiated settlement. In-
stead, Hanoi would support the Southern revolution, deploying main force
units on the battlefield to annihilate the “puppet” South Vietnamese army.
“In fighting the American troops,” Le Duan noted, “we must try to select
their weak points and situations where they are weak in order to annihilate
them.” General Nguyen Chi Thanh, commander of the Southern revolution-
ary forces, backed this aggressive military strategy. Doubting the allies pos-
sessed enough combat strength to offer battle and support pacification, Thanh
insisted his forces not only harass U.S. and ARVN units but also conduct
large-scale regimental attacks. Against technologically superior U.S. forces,
such a strategy might prove costly, but it would maintain pressure on the
United States while simultaneously wearing down the RVN. From MACV’s
perspective, the evidence in early 1966 suggested the enemy “was now looking
toward a protracted and difficult war.”48
Recognizing Hanoi’s commitment to both the political and the mili-
tary struggle, U.S. policymakers at Honolulu delineated for Westmoreland
six goals they believed best supported the overarching aims of defeating the
enemy and extending GVN dominion and control. Assistant Secretary of
Defense John McNaughton and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs William Bundy drafted the formal memorandum. After
laying out planned increases for allied troop strengths in the coming year,
McNaughton and Bundy indicated these forces would expand their offensive
operations against the enemy while providing “essential defense” of key polit-
ical and population centers inside the RVN. Westmoreland’s six benchmarks
for success concluded the memorandum. First, MACV would increase to 60
percent the population living in secure areas, a 10 percent increase from cur-
rent U.S. estimates. Next, the allies would increase the critical roads and rail-
roads open for use from 20 percent to 50 percent. The third goal envisioned
47. Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), p. 78. On Le Duan, see also Pierre Asselin,
“Le Duan, the American War, and the Creation of an Independent Vietnamese State,” The Journal of
American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 10, No. 1/2 (Spring/Summer 2001), pp. 1–27.
48. Le Duan quoted in David W. P. Elliott, “Hanoi’s Strategy in the Second Indochina War,” in
Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, eds., The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 82. On Thanh, see William J. Duiker, The Communist Road
to Power, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 273–274. According to “USMACV
Command History,” p. 2: “MACV’s estimate of enemy intentions was that they would attack in
mass whenever they thought victory was possible. At the same time, they would continue terrorism,
harassment, sabotage, propaganda, and small hit-and-run attacks aimed at controlling the population
and blocking any significant gains in GVN nation-building.”
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a 30 percent increase in the destruction of Vietcong and North Vietnamese
Army base areas (to roughly 50 percent) within the confines of RVN bor-
ders. Without question, this first set of three goals revealed the influence of
Defense Department systems analysts determined to validate a quantitative
approach to wartime management in Southeast Asia. Whether MACV could
be so precise in achieving these exact figures remained to be seen.49
McNaughton and Bundy, however, appreciated the president’s larger aims
at Honolulu and ensured the final three goals supported Johnson’s intent of
incorporating political and nonmilitary plans into the larger military strategy.
The fourth goal thus charged Westmoreland with ensuring the “defense of all
military bases, political and population centers and food-producing areas now
under government control.” The influence of contemporary army doctrine
was clearly visible. Fifth, MACV would provide military security necessary
for pacification of “high-priority” areas (left unclear in the original message)
and increase the pacified population there by 235,000. Finally, in what came
to overshadow all other aspects of the Honolulu conference, Westmoreland
was to “attrite, by year’s end,” Vietcong and North Vietnamese army “forces
at a rate at least as high as their capacity to put men in the field.”50 Critics ever
since have disparaged the MACV commander for pursuing, at all costs, this
unattainable “crossover point” while ignoring the imperatives of population-
centric counterinsurgency. Yet Westmoreland had already established a com-
prehensive strategy that entailed much more than simply killing the enemy.
His mid-1965 concept of operations and subsequent directives consistently
spoke of coordinating nonmilitary and political efforts with larger military
aims, and the McNaughton-Bundy memorandum did little more than direct
Westmoreland to proceed as planned.51
This way forward held potential pitfalls, however. Westmoreland recalled
that the “goals were optimistic, but I agreed they were good objectives to shoot
for. I fully concurred with the establishment of goals, not so much for us as for
49. McNaughton memorandum, 10 February 1966, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. IV, pp. 216–217;
Davidson, Vietnam at War, p. 358; and Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of
Escalation, 1962–1967 (Washington, DC: CMH, 2006), p. 257. Westmoreland recalled in his mem-
oirs: “Statistics were, admittedly, an imperfect gauge of progress, yet in the absence of conventional
front lines, how else to measure it?” See Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 332.
50. Johnson-Nehru conversation, 10 February 1966, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. IV, p. 218. John
Prados discusses the “attrition strategy” coming out of the Honolulu conference in “American Strategy
in the Vietnam War,” in David L. Anderson, ed., The Columbia History of the Vietnam War (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 251.
51. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 195. Exemplifying a critical appraisal of Westmoreland’s strat-
egy, focusing on organizational culture, is Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Balti-
more, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
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the South Vietnamese—to stimulate them.” Therein lay crucial assumptions
imperiling the entire U.S. effort in Vietnam. Senior U.S. military leaders and
embassy officials could do no more than “urge” the Saigon government to
implement the goals outlined at Honolulu. Even if Thieu and Ky were more
compliant than Diem had been, they were still their own men. Despite being
cognizant of the worth of U.S. aid and support, they were wary of Western
influence while guiding a social revolution inside the RVN. Moreover, factors
outside U.S. influence were already undercutting allied plans. One week after
the conference ended, U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge informed Presi-
dent Johnson that the “economic situation overall has become critical during
the last two months,” and South Vietnamese army desertion rates “continue
to be unsatisfactory.”52 Finally, questions lingered over basic definitions. In
March, Lodge, suggesting that setting goals and working to achieve them by
a specific date was “not the traditional Vietnamese way,” found it necessary
to ask the president “to define exactly what we mean by pacification.” For
his part, Westmoreland later expressed regret in formalizing the term “search
and destroy,” even though the goals established in Honolulu “could not be
achieved without such tactics.”53
Johnson raised few, if any, of these impending problems during the con-
ference’s final public pronouncements. In a joint statement with Thieu and
Ky, the president emphasized construction programs in an “effort to build
democracy in the rural areas—an effort as important as the military battle it-
self.” Offering short commentary on military operations, allied leaders instead
spoke in familiar New Deal language about the need to intensify health and
education programs and to bolster production output and rural electrification.
The 8 February Declaration of Honolulu put forth similar themes. The allies
dedicated themselves to the “eradication of social injustice,” to establishing a
“stable, viable economy,” and to defeating those “illegally fighting” on South
Vietnamese soil.54 The lofty rhetoric of free self-government and social rev-
olutions, however, failed to convince many journalists back home. One day
52. Westmoreland, interview by Miles, p. 10; and Lodge memorandum, 16 February 1966, in FRUS,
1964–1968, Vol. IV, pp. 223–226. For a view of the U.S. embassy dealing with the “problem of
intragovernmental conflict” in Saigon, see Richard Critchfield, “Lessons of Vietnam,” The Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 380 (November 1968), pp. 125–134.
53. The Pentagon Papers, Vol. 2, p. 550; and W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, eds., The
Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 64. Richard A. Hunt discusses the origins of
the term “pacification” in what remains one of the best overall works on the subject, Pacification: The
American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 11.
54. Joint statement in Johnson, Public Papers, pp. 152–153; and Honolulu Conference Materials,
February 1966, in Folder 4, Box 6, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 02-Military Operations, TTUVA.
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after the allied declaration, The New York Times suggested the conference “left
confusion in its wake, with more questions raised than answered.” Stanley
Karnow, writing in The Washington Post, claimed the “earnest assertions, pi-
ous hopes and brave statements” were more aims than solutions. Finally, the
influential Walter Lippman was convinced that Johnson was misreading his-
tory, his “hot and unexamined generalities . . . a moral commitment to endless
crusading in all the continents.”55
Returning to Washington, an outwardly confident Johnson told reporters
the road ahead would be difficult but that the allies would prevail in their bat-
tle against aggression. The optimism surrounding the president’s homecoming
proved short-lived. The day of the Honolulu declaration, retired Lieutenant
General James M. Gavin testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, questioning the efficacy of Johnson’s Vietnam policy. The former com-
mander of the 82nd Airborne Division suspected that escalation in Southeast
Asia was beginning “to hurt our world strategic position.” Two days later,
George Kennan echoed Gavin’s concerns, declaring that even if “South Viet-
nam was controlled exclusively by the Viet Cong, while regrettable and no
doubt morally unwarranted, [it] would not present . . . dangers great enough
to justify our direct military intervention.”56 (Perhaps in response to the Ful-
bright hearings, Harris and Gallup public opinion polls in February revealed
declining confidence in Johnson’s handling of the war.)57 These public chal-
lenges to U.S. foreign policy seemed all the more prescient when antigovern-
ment demonstrations erupted in the northern provinces of South Vietnam
during the first weeks of March. By late spring, the non-Communist demon-
strators appeared to be on the verge of instigating an outright civil war.58 If
Johnson had intended for the Honolulu conference to calm dissent and mark a
55. “Questions after Honolulu . . . ,” The New York Times, 9 February 1966, p. 38; Stanley Karnow,
“Conference Mixes Hopes and Hazards,” The Washington Post, 9 February 1966, p. A1; and Walter
Lippman, “President’s Vietnam Talk Seems to Show a Misreading of History,” Los Angeles Times, 9
February 1966, p. A5. See also Foreign Reaction to the Honolulu Conference, 10 February 1966, in
Folder 3, Box 4, Larry Berman Collection (Presidential Archives Research), TTUVA. French journalist
Jean Lacoutre argued that “the Honolulu meeting exposed the nearly total failure of a great Western
power to understand public opinion in a small country, where feelings of oppression and resentment
have been smoldering for years.” Quoted in Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War,
p. 233.
56. “Vietnam Policy—Testimony at the Committee Hearings,” Congressional Digest, Vol. 45, No. 4
(April 1966), pp. 107–108. Johnson’s homecoming remarks are from Johnson, The Vantage Point,
p. 245. John Prados suggests the hearings “legitimized opposition and helped lay the foundation for
dissenters.” See Prados, Vietnam, p. 166.
57. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, p. 175.
58. Cosmas, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, pp. 445–446.
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“new departure,” he clearly had misread the political landscapes both at home
and abroad.59
Emphasis on the political crisis in South Vietnam and the growing dis-
satisfaction at home, however, should not reinforce false narratives that the
February summit was “essentially a public relations exercise.” Nor should the
final goal outlined by McNaughton and Bundy (to attrite enemy forces at a
substantial rate) be seen as corroboration of shallow claims that Westmoreland
and senior military officials yearned only to reach an elusive “crossover point”
to win the war.60 Scholars should take Johnson at his word when he said the
allies were trying to defeat not only aggression but also “social misery.”61 Per-
haps questioning the president’s sincerity is misplaced when considering his
proclamation that “We are trying to establish a stable democratic government,
and we are searching for an honorable and just peace.”62 The failures of the
Honolulu conference arguably lay not in missed opportunities for peace or a
narrow U.S. military strategy.63 Rather, the Hawaii summit exposed a naïve
U.S. vision of South Vietnam out of step with the local conditions of a society
long at war over fundamental issues of identity and nationalism in the mod-
ern era. Westmoreland had to match Johnson’s soaring rhetoric to the political
and military realities of South Vietnam.
The Problems of Implementation
MACV’s commander returned to Saigon with the president’s
encouragement—a personal telegram from Johnson on 12 February noted,
“we are on the right track”—and high expectations for “real progress” in the
war on social misery. Westmoreland replied the following day. “Be assured
we shall continue to press forward on the military front. Further, I shall
59. Dallek, Flawed Giant, p. 355. On the antiwar movement in 1966, see Charles DeBenedetti with
Charles Chatfield, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 1990), pp. 141–167.
60. Thies, When Governments Collide, p. 336; and Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies
Win (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), p. 121. For a discussion of Hanoi’s forces also at-
tempting to “attrite their enemy in many fields,” see BDM Corporation, “A Study of Strategic Lessons
Learned in Vietnam,” Vol. 6: “Conduct of the War,” General Holdings, in MHI, pp. 3-27–3-28.
61. Johnson, Public Papers, p. 223; and Robert Topmiller, “A Missed Opportunity for Peace in
Vietnam—1966,” Peace & Change, Vol. 27, No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 59–96.
62. Questioning military strategy in James M. Gavin, “A Soldier’s Doubts,” Harper’s, February 1966,
pp. 115–116.
63. For a response, see Joseph Alsop, “Vietnam Coastal Enclave Strategy Could Mean Many Dien
Bien Phus,” Los Angeles Times, 9 February 1966, p. A5.
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support in full measure within the capabilities of my command the important
and essential non-military programs of the mission.”64 One week later,
Westmoreland held a command conference at the 5th Special Forces Group
headquarters in Nha Trang. His opening remarks concentrated on Honolulu,
which he had found productive thanks to the candid discussion with Johnson
and the promise of additional resources. After a lengthy dialogue on logistical
shortfalls and future troop buildups, Westmoreland turned to the South
Vietnamese economy and the political implications if Saigon’s leaders could
not control the rampant inflation threatening to undermine the war effort.
Emphasizing his “continuing concern regarding the identification of the
Viet Cong [political] infrastructure,” the general then discussed GVN rural
construction plans and his intent to “do everything we can to support . . .
this very important program.” Throughout, the military effort interlaced this
wide-ranging conversation, the conference itself suggesting that Westmore-
land appreciated much more than battlefield tactics and troop deployment
schedules.65
In fact, the allied campaign plan for 1966, promulgated by the MACV
staff on 31 December 1965, underscored how well Westmoreland’s opera-
tional concept accorded with the strategic goals outlined in Hawaii. (By pre-
ceding the conference, the publication date also raises doubt over the general’s
claims that the Honolulu summit “dictated subsequent strategy and tactics of
the war.”) According to the MACV command history, the “basic objectives
of the campaign for 1966 were to clear, secure, and assist in the economic
development of the heavily populated areas around Saigon, in the Mekong
delta, and in selected portions of the coastal plain.”66 Concurrently, U.S.
troops would defend outlying political centers through search-and-destroy
operations against enemy main force units. Westmoreland intended these of-
fensives to facilitate the South Vietnamese forces’ defense of governmental
centers and rice-producing areas, providing a shield behind which pacification
64. Johnson’s telegram in The Pentagon Papers, Vol. 2, p. 561. Westmoreland’s response in Cable,
13 February 1966, in Folder 4, Box 4, Larry Berman Collection (Presidential Archives Research),
TTUVA. On the aftermath of the conference, see Robert Buzzanco, Masters of War: Military Dissent
and Politics in the Vietnam Era (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 256–257.
Westmoreland did “not recall any dissent that was made” over MACV’s strategy at the time. A Soldier
Reports, p. 256.
65. See MACV Commander’s Conference, 20 February 1966, in Counter VCI Folder, Historian’s
Files, CMH. For a discussion on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s parallel attempts to undermine
the insurgency’s political infrastructure, see Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and
Counterinsurgency (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2010).
66. Westmoreland in Thompson and Frizzell, The Lessons of Vietnam, p. 11; and “USMACV Com-
mand History,” pp. 340–341.
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programs could take root. A host of supporting tasks, complementing the
goals laid out by McNaughton and Bundy, served to advance MACV’s cam-
paign plan—defending major base areas, opening and securing main roads,
providing security for the expansion of GVN control, and denying the enemy
rice by protecting harvests and capturing caches in enemy storage dumps.
Concerned about troop indoctrination, Westmoreland also directed the pub-
lication of a “ready reference” pamphlet on South Vietnam defining the
“twofold” mission as supporting the GVN against Communist aggression and
assisting in the development of the country.67
Military operations also remained a major part of MACV’s strategic ap-
proach. Yet battle served a larger purpose in Westmoreland’s mind; it was not
simply a tool for the attrition of enemy forces. In reviewing his concept for
1966, the general noted that monsoon-season “offensive tactical operations”
were intended to force the enemy “to fight under conditions of our choosing,”
thus freeing a greater number of allied troops for area security and revolution-
ary development support missions.68 However, MACV never realized these
ideals. Enemy forces, especially insurgents conducting raids and ambushes,
held the tactical initiative throughout much of the year, and the threat of NVA
main force units—North Vietnamese infiltration remained high in 1966—
precluded greater attention to revolutionary development. Even as the United
States grappled with the problem of balancing military and nonmilitary ef-
forts, the South Vietnamese were contending with their own troubles. The
March demonstrations now included not only student protestors but ARVN
soldiers. Prime Minister Ky blamed much of the civil unrest on a “militant
Buddhist faction,” but larger issues were clearly at play. Protesters demanded
the creation of a national assembly, general elections, and an end to corrup-
tion in the general officer corps. Ky, aware of rising discontent against the
military junta, saw “no viable democratic civilian alternative.”69 If MACV was
to move forward in accomplishing the goals delineated in Honolulu, it would
do so from a shaky political foundation.
The nonmilitary aspects of the conference goals proved exceedingly dif-
ficult not only to achieve but even simply to measure. On the day of the
67. MACV Office of Information, “Ready Reference Facts on South Vietnam,” n.d., in Box 3, Joseph
A. McChristian Papers, MHI; and Concept of Military Operations, 26 August 1966, in Box 6, Paul
L. Miles Papers, MHI, p. 2. See also Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War in Vietnam, p. 113.
68. Concept of Military Operations, 26 August 1966, p. 2. On difficulties measuring progress in the
aftermath of Honolulu, see “USMACV Command History,” pp. 541–542.
69. Ky, Buddha’s Child, pp. 198–199. For an assessment agreeing with Ky, see Mark Moyar, “Political
Monks: The Militant Buddhist Movement during the Vietnam War,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 38,
No. 4 (October 2004), pp. 749–784.
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Honolulu declaration, The Christian Science Monitor reported that less than
one sixth of South Vietnam was “sufficiently free” of Vietcong influence and
“much of that is insecure.”70 At Hawaii, however, the U.S. delegation esti-
mated 50 percent of the population was living in secure areas. Westmore-
land might be charged with raising nationwide security by 10 percent, but
merely approximating a baseline figure for who actually was “secure” generated
wildly contradictory numbers. Moreover, the expansion of security came with
a price. Westmoreland saw “no way to separate security considerations from
pacification operations,” yet MACV’s concept relied on South Vietnamese
forces accomplishing the latter.71 If U.S. troops succeeded in clearing national
priority areas for their ARVN counterparts to hold, then the Saigon govern-
ment would require additional troops to extend GVN influence into those
recently cleared areas. This, according to the MACV command history, “pre-
sented a dilemma.” Regional and popular forces, akin to local militias, consti-
tuted the bulk of forces assigned holding duties, but they were “far down in
priority for training, equipment, and leadership, which resulted in marginal
or unsatisfactory ratings in almost every category of their activities.” Though
unfair given the challenges local militia troops faced, Komer’s complaint that
the “civil side has to work through a weak and apathetic GVN” demonstrated
mounting U.S. frustrations even at this relatively early stage of the war.72
Nonetheless, key questions remained. What did “secure” really mean?
What indices accurately measured progress toward an objective that defied
easy explication? Should the allies assess physical security of the rural popu-
lation or attitudes on political stability inside Saigon? Surely, how secure one
felt mattered. Valid measurements of security and the relationship of such
measurements to development programs proved difficult to formulate, how-
ever. MACV found that despite positive reports from the field, many “local
officials had a tendency to accept substandard construction and security” to
meet deadlines. So unstable (and thus insecure?) had the revolting northern
provinces become in May that Marine General Lewis Walt had to threaten
to shoot down South Vietnamese air force jets that were planning an attack
70. Saville R. Davis, “Doubts Cloud Vietnam Reforms,” The Christian Science Monitor, 8 February
1966, p. 1.
71. Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War in Vietnam, p. 119. For a South Vietnamese perspec-
tive, see Tran Dinh Tho, “Pacification,” in Lewis Sorley, ed., The Vietnam War: An Assessment by South
Vietnam’s Generals (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2010), pp. 215–264.
72. “USMACV Command History,” p. 108; and Komer to Johnson, 9 May 1966, in FRUS, 1964–
1968, Vol. IV, p. 374. On Komer’s view of the issue as a “management problem,” see Frank L. Jones,
Blowtorch: Robert Komer, Vietnam, and American Cold War Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2013), p. 101.
176
The 1966 Honolulu Conference and the Shape of the Vietnam War
on dissident ARVN units in their compounds.73 Yet the precision of MACV’s
quantitative assessments apparently prevailed over this uncertain landscape.
In early July, Westmoreland reported that “secured areas had increased by 2.4
percent.” Soldiers on the ground likely would have questioned the exactitude
of MACV’s reporting system. The tactical fighting proved far more confus-
ing. One soldier in the 25th Infantry Division recalled that the enemy “al-
ways hit us where we were weakest, always decided when, where, and how
to fight us and when to break away and melt into the local populace or go
down the tunnels.” U.S. correspondents found a war-weary population tiring
of constant reform promises while seeing few improvements in countryside
security.74
Complications in opening up critical roadways contributed to larger is-
sues with winning the rural population’s allegiance. Concerned about keeping
the enemy off balance and preventing main force units from striking at will,
Westmoreland often prioritized military traffic on key lines of communication
accessing South Vietnam’s interior. While tactically sensible, the preemption
of port space, rail lines, and waterways for military operations forced the civil
side, in Komer’s words, to make do “with what is left.” In June, Komer painted
a fuller picture for Johnson by outlining what he called the “problem of scale.”
Convinced the allies were not moving fast enough in the civil arena, the presi-
dent’s special assistant offered some “crude comparisons” for instruction. “We
are spending perhaps $15–18 billion on the military side and only $700–800
million on the civil side. We’ve deployed about 300,000 troops compared to
about 3,000 civilians.” South Vietnamese numbers appeared comparable.75
Although Komer’s analysis was far from comprehensive, it suggested deeper
issues with the allied approach, in particular that the war effort was unbal-
anced. Hanoi’s commitment to offensive operations inside the RVN necessi-
tated a military response, yet that response increasingly pulled attention and
resources away from the developmental side of the struggle. Fighting aggres-
sion was transcending the fight against social misery.
73. “USMACV Command History,” pp. 543–544; and Walt in The Pentagon Papers, Vol. 2, p. 375.
See also Lewis W. Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General’s Report on Vietnam (New York: Funk
& Wagnalls, 1970), pp. 113–124.
74. Eric M. Bergerud, Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning: The World of a Combat Division in Vietnam
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), p. 253; and “War-Weary Vietnamese Tire of Reform Promises,”
The Christian Science Monitor, 12 February 1966, p. 5.
75. Komer to Johnson, 9 May 1966, 14 June 1966, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. IV, pp. 374, 420; and
“USMACV Command History,” p. 347. On realizing economic goals, see Updated Report on Status
of Implementation—Honolulu Agreements, 30–31 March 1966, in Folder 12, Box 4, Larry Berman
Collection (Presidential Archives Research), TTUVA.
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Arguably, the very goals outlined at Honolulu produced this imbalance.
The destruction of enemy base areas, for instance, was at odds with opening
critical roads for economic use. During an April press briefing, Westmoreland
estimated that twelve North Vietnamese army and thirteen Vietcong regi-
ments were inside the RVN. When accounting for “guerrillas, cadre and lo-
gistic support troops,” MACV approximated a total of 250,000 enemy troops
in country.76 If security preceded development as current doctrine prescribed,
Westmoreland deemed it essential that allied forces strike enemy base areas
and start wearing down the forces there. The matter became all the more
important given political constraints forbidding MACV’s commander from
sending troops into Cambodia and Laos to disrupt enemy sanctuaries sus-
taining the military effort in South Vietnam. In the process, though, military
traffic took precedence on roads designated as key economic routes. Worse,
attacking an enemy that was in some places tightly interwoven into the fab-
ric of South Vietnamese society meant putting noncombatants at risk. Al-
though MACV officers genuinely attempted to limit civilian casualties, the
war unfolding around them became all the more horrific once U.S. units be-
gan bringing vast amounts of firepower to bear. Mohr, reporting in June on
the use of “cluster bomb units,” found the canisters of 800 bomblets, some
spewing both napalm and steel pellets, to be as “stupendous” as they were
“terrifying.”77
No doubt many South Vietnamese civilians, caught between U.S. fire-
power and VC political intimidation, agreed with Mohr’s assessment. Al-
though some among the rural population sincerely backed the insurgent
cause, the contest over the people’s loyalty reflected, in two contemporary
observers’ words, “the undeveloped state of South Vietnamese political con-
sensus.” Here, in the political arena, U.S. forces faced their greatest challenges.
MACV understood clearly the Saigon government’s efforts to “regain the con-
fidence and loyalty of the rural population” and that it “must remain a GVN
76. Westmoreland Briefing, 30 April 1966, in Folder 3, Box 6, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 01-
Assessment and Strategy, TTUVA, p. 5. On attacking base areas, see MACV Monthly Evaluation
Report, June 1966, in MHI, p. 3. Edwin Moïse tackles the problem of Westmoreland’s command
(under)estimating enemy strength in the years before the 1968 Tet offensive in The Myths of Tet:
The Most Misunderstood Event of the Vietnam War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2017),
esp. chs. 2–3.
77. Charles Mohr, “Vast U.S. Firepower Arrayed in Vietnam against Guerrillas,” The New York Times,
28 June 1966, p. 2. Westmoreland’s command stressed that a “conscious effort was made to minimize
noncombatant casualties.” See MACV, “USMACV Command History,” 196t, in NARA, p. 161. For
a contrasting view depicting civilian suffering as the norm and war crimes a natural outgrowth of U.S.
command policies, see Nick Turse, Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam (New
York: Metropolitan Books, 2013).
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responsibility, with the U.S. in an unobtrusive advisory and support role.”78
U.S. troops, however, were anything but unobtrusive. When an April status
report on the Honolulu conference goals found the prospects for local village
elections “still in doubt,” pressures mounted within the U.S. mission to coerce
Thieu and Ky’s government into action. Moreover, the U.S. logistical and fi-
nancial support to the GVN’s Revolutionary Development Cadre, along with
U.S. advisers coordinating related security efforts, undercut the narrative of
pacification being a South Vietnamese endeavor.79
As with “security,” the definition of “pacification” remained contested.
One week after the Hawaii summit, the Los Angeles Times suggested “pacifica-
tion” was a word of “changing meanings, and sometimes of no real meaning
at all, except for the peasant’s desire to live at peace, grow and market his
rice without double taxation or fear of Communist confiscation.” Ky spoke
in terms of a social revolution to create a “new life,” but senior U.S. offi-
cials emphasized the relationship between Saigon and the rural population.
At Honolulu, Johnson urged his counterparts to “get closer to the people”
and recommended that Ky “spend more time in the countryside playing the
role of a politician rather than a general.”80 One month later, Colonel John
H. Cushman published a topical essay in Army magazine. An adviser with the
ARVN 21st Infantry Division, Cushman believed he had developed a work-
able concept that, if replicated nationwide, might turn the war around. But he
acknowledged that success depended on the people. A series of “ifs” followed.
If only dedicated South Vietnamese could be found to become “good district
chiefs.” If only the GVN could develop a political organization equally as ef-
fective as the Vietcong. If only Saigon could regain control of the countryside.
Cushman’s essay articulated, powerfully but likely unintentionally, the limits
of U.S. influence in arousing a genuine commitment from the South Viet-
namese people for their government—if, in fact, that is what “pacification”
meant.81
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Cushman’s emphasis on control hinted at further problems with the U.S.
goals outlined in Honolulu. One week before the conference, The Washing-
ton Star reported that the Saigon government controlled barely one-fourth
of the country. By the end of 1966, MACV confirmed only a 5 percent in-
crease of the population living in secure areas. (Senior officials often conflated
the terms “control” and “security” without a full understanding of either.) Yet
even these figures appeared dubious. Komer’s midyear summary to the pres-
ident conceded: “We don’t really know enough about what’s happening at
the cutting edge down in the village or even district.”82 The admission was
telling. Undertaking the task of nation-building, U.S. officials quickly found
that providing the South Vietnamese with economic and social benefits was
failing to reap rewards in loyalty from or influence over the rural population.
Even though U.S. officials recognized the essential role played by the ARVN in
expanding areas under governmental control, they equally blamed thei South
Vietnamese troops for failing to measure up. One late-year report offered a
laundry list of U.S. complaints about the ARVN: “poor leadership, harshness
toward the civilian population, corruption, lack of aggressiveness.”83 If the
U.S. mission in Vietnam hoped to expand GVN control, relying on the local
army to do so was proving disappointing.
So, too, were efforts in battlefield attrition of enemy forces. In April 1966,
MACV reported that despite substantial losses, enemy forces inside South
Vietnam continued to increase. Insurgent forces in particular avoided signif-
icant contact with the technologically superior U.S. troops, whose firepower
too often demolished the countryside. One woman compared a U.S. attack
to clear her village of Vietcong to “a raging elephant stomping on red ants
too far down in their holes to feel the blows.”84 Westmoreland complained
82. John T. Wheeler, “Only a Fourth of South Viet Nam Is under Control of Saigon Regime,” The
Washington Star, 25 January 1966, p. A4. On the problems of defining control, see Bernard B. Fall,
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that less aggressive ARVN units were faring no better. Yet larger questions sur-
rounded MACV’s goal for attrition. What was the North’s capacity to put men
in the field? How could the U.S. Army assess whether its military operations
were influencing Hanoi’s will? Perhaps most important, MACV admitted that
despite gains in coping with the enemy’s main force units, “the communist
political infrastructure retained its strength and vigor” throughout South Viet-
nam. In this sense, Hanoi’s capacity to put men in the field, estimated at
75,000–100,000 annually, may have missed the point. Containing the infil-
tration of NVA units into the South may have mattered only if the GVN
was making comparable progress in the political struggle for the population’s
loyalty.85
That the enemy’s political infrastructure counted as much as its military
strength suggested a multifaceted problem in balancing the competing de-
mands of nation-building during a war. As early as February, Hanson Bald-
win had reported in The New York Times that the nation’s armed forces were
“spread dangerously thin in Vietnam and elsewhere.” With midsummer as-
sessments characterizing the ARVN as the “weak link in the chain,” it ap-
peared that U.S. troops would be called on for even greater sacrifices if the
goals outlined in Honolulu were to be achieved by year’s end.86 But progress,
so difficult to measure in a war without fronts, proved hard to establish. As
1967 opened, MACV could only report on the limitations of past “yardsticks”
for evaluating progress, admitting the “limitations of past and present sys-
tems.”87 Given these shortcomings, the Honolulu goals quietly faded from
public debate. Although the framework (without the precise quantification)
continued to shape Westmoreland’s campaign plans over the next two years,
U.S. policymakers confronted in early 1967 the prospects of an increasingly
stalemated war. None of the Honolulu goals had been fully achieved.
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Impractical Means, Improbable Ends
In August 1966, Westmoreland was already turning his attention to the 1967
campaign plan. Hoping to promote a better understanding of his concepts,
he sent a cable to Pacific Command, with copies to the White House, out-
lining the allied effort in South Vietnam. Although the enemy had taken a
beating during the year, he nonetheless remained “determined.” Thus, West-
moreland’s strategy for the coming year would “be one of a general offensive
with maximum practical support to area and population security in further
support of revolutionary development.” The enemy threat, at least as per-
ceived by MACV, continued to shape allied concepts of operation. So, too, did
the sequential approach to nation-building advocated by army doctrine and
contemporary military theory. Westmoreland seemed adamant on this point.
“The essential tasks of revolutionary development and nation building,” he
argued, “cannot be accomplished if enemy main forces can gain access to the
population centers and destroy our efforts.” With the additional U.S. forces
approved at Honolulu, MACV foresaw the ARVN shifting more of its weight
to supporting nonmilitary programs. The concept for 1967 accordingly mir-
rored the language used at Honolulu. Westmoreland spoke about defending
base areas, opening railroads, securing the population, and reinforcing offen-
sive operations. If the conference goals were not achieved in 1966, they would
remain largely in place the following year.88
The Honolulu conference thus left a lasting legacy on U.S. strategy.
MACV took seriously Johnson’s call for a war on social misery and faith-
fully integrated nonmilitary programs into its campaign plans. Allied military
operations often caused the very misery Johnson hoped to alleviate, but after
the Honolulu conference the U.S. mission in Vietnam took great strides in
expanding revolutionary development. In November 1966, the U.S. ambas-
sador announced the creation of the Office of Civil Operations, and West-
moreland named a brigadier general as his special assistant for pacification.
Six months later the president approved the formation of a larger organiza-
tion, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).
Johnson named Komer, with full ambassadorial rank, as chief of CORDS and
granted him wide leeway over nonmilitary programs. This expanded “organi-
zational machinery for pacification,” however, fostered only limited gains in
88. Concept of Military Operations in SVN, 26 August 1966, in Historian’s Files, U.S. Strategy,
Vietnam, 1965–76, CMH. To Southeast Asia specialist Bernard Fall, the conference goals were not
achieved. “If the high-sounding principles of the Honolulu Declaration . . . were to be the gauge of
accomplishment in the field of socio-economic development in Vietnam, then the past year will have
proven a regrettable failure.” Fall, “Vietnam,” p. 12.
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revolutionary development over the coming years.89 Moreover, any progress
made often went undetected by the U.S. public, who increasingly questioned
the merits of what appeared a stalemated war.
The U.S. approach outlined at Honolulu was comprehensive. Perhaps
because of that comprehensiveness, the U.S. effort in Vietnam faltered. Al-
though officers grappled with the “complex interrelationships of military,
economic, social, psychological, and political aspects” of the war, they failed
to appreciate that their multiple goals often were working at cross-purposes.
“Stimulating” aggressive military action and supporting civic action theoreti-
cally went hand in hand, but implementing both simultaneously proved im-
practical.90 More importantly, the Honolulu goals suggested that the U.S.
delegation was overestimating its ability to dominate events inside South Viet-
nam. If success truly required a social revolution in the South—as Ky, and
Diem before him, prescribed—it became increasingly clear after Honolulu
that no U.S. personnel could harness that revolution for their own ends. This
predicament should have been clearer given recent history. As Indochinese
specialist Bernard Fall reminded readers, “the new pacification plans of the
1966 Honolulu Declaration echo an old French dilemma: how to promote
real reforms while prosecuting a war and without making the government one
supports look like a ‘puppet.’”91 Few U.S. officials, however, questioned their
country’s capacity to incite a social revolution and build a democracy all while
fighting a war against a determined enemy.
In 1971, Westmoreland, who by then was serving as the Army Chief of
Staff, recalled in an interview that the “Honolulu Conference was a turning
point in Johnson’s conduct of the war.” In Hawaii, the president “realized
he was committed to war.” That commitment, however, rested on unrealis-
tic expectations and on a near blind faith in the U.S. government’s power
to influence local South Vietnamese realities. More circumspect policymakers
questioned the prospects of motivating the people to support Saigon’s govern-
ment. As the Hawaii summit concluded, a senior official seemed pessimistic
in achieving such lofty political goals. “I don’t want to raise hopes that we
89. Organization in Herring, LBJ and Vietnam, p. 78; and Cooper et al., “The American Experience
with Pacification in Vietnam,” p. 225.
90. Montague, “Pacification,” p. 5. On aggressive action and winning “hearts and minds,” see “Tactical
Standing Operating Procedure for Counterinsurgency Operations,” Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 101st
Division, 1 June 1966, in VNI Folder 17, CMH, p. I-1.
91. Bernard B. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness: 1953–66 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 342; and
Bundy memorandum, 23 February 1966, p. 248.
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cannot justify.”92 Here, arguably, the Honolulu conference offers the most
useful perspective for evaluating more-current foreign policy problems. Power
and prestige do not always translate into influence abroad, and exporting
democracy in a time of war may be the most challenging mission assigned
to U.S. armed forces. Few U.S. officials at Honolulu seemed to grasp the
daunting challenges.93 Establishing strategic goals without fully considering
the limits of one’s power may be an exercise in counterproductive futility at
best, or arrogant ineptitude at worst.
92. Westmoreland, interview by Miles, p. 7; Davis, “Doubts Cloud Vietnam Reforms”; and LTC
James C. Swain, VNIT 30, in CMH, p. 13.
93. Lawrence E. Grinter, “Bargaining between Saigon and Washington: Dilemmas of Linkage Politics
during War,” Orbis, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 1974), p. 837.
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